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Abstract—In this work, we propose and analyse a
new approach for securing localization and location ver-
iﬁcation in wireless networks based on hidden and mo-
bile base stations. Our approach enables secure localiza-
tion with a broad spectrum of localization techniques:
ultrasonic or radio, based on received signal strength
or signal time of ﬂight. Through several examples we
show how this approach can be used to secure node-
centric and infrastructure-centric localization schemes.
We further show how this approach can be applied
to secure localization in mobile ad-hoc and sensor
networks.
I. Introduction
In the last decade, researchers have proposed a num-
ber of localization and ranging techniques for wireless
networks [50], [51], [35], [4], [20], [10]. The use of these
techniques is broad and ranges from enabling networking
functions (i.e., position-based routing) to enabling location-
related applications (e.g., access control, data harvesting).
The proposed techniques were mainly studied in non-
adversarial settings. Ranging and localization techniques
are, however, highly vulnerable to attacks from dishonest
nodes and external attackers; dishonest nodes can report
false position and distance information in order to cheat
on their locations; external attackers can spoof measured
locations of honest nodes. Localization and ranging tech-
niques in wireless networks mainly rely on measurements of
the times of ﬂight of radio (RF ToF) or ultrasound signals
(US ToF), and on the measurements of received strengths
of radio signals of devices (RF RSS). An attacker can
generally inﬂuence all these measurements by jamming and
delaying signals, and by modifying their signal strengths.
Localization systems based on ultrasound time of ﬂight (US
ToF) and those based on measurements of signal strength
of radio signals (RF RSS) are particularly vulnerable to
position spooﬁng attacks. Systems based on radio time of
ﬂight measurements are less vulnerable to attacks because
of the high speed of signal propagation.
Recently, a number of secure localization techniques were
proposed [25], [26], [48], [28], [29] to cope with these prob-
lems. These mechanisms rely on GPS, high speed hardware,
directional antennas, robust statistics or spread spectrum
techniques using spreading codes. An eﬃcient implementa-
tion of these protocols remains a challenge, however, since
almost all of them rely on ToA ranging and generally assume
fast processing hardware (ns) at the prover (except in the
case of ultra sound implementations, which are limited
in range). Our proposal works with simple ranging (not
with distance-bounding) and therefore does not require fast
processing at the prover (claimant). Our proposal works
equally well using any kind of ranging, even low-cost RSSI-
based methods (e.g., [4], [20], [10])
Our approach to secure localization relies on a set of
covert base stations. By covert base stations (CBS), we
mean base stations whose locations are not known by the at-
tacker at the time of the execution of the secure localization.
In our system, locations of covert base stations represent a
secret input (a key) to the system. Covert base stations can
be realized by hiding or disguising static base station or by
the random motion of mobile base stations. Typically,covert
base stations are passive.
The aim of the protocols in this paper is to ensure that
a node can not lie about its position and thus pretend to
be in a diﬀerent physical location than the one it occupies,
e.g., a node can not (successfully) claim to be in a room if
the node is outside that room (e.g., for location-based access
control).
We show through three example protocols how covert
base stations can be used to secure node-centric and
infrastructure-centric localization, as well as for localization
and location-veriﬁcation in ad-hoc and sensor networks. We
discuss how security of the proposed protocols depends on
the precision of the localization and ranging techniques, and
on the number of the covert base stations. We capture this
analytically.
The organization of the rest of the paper is as fol-
lows. In Section II, we present our system model. In Sec-
tions III and IV we present protocols for secure local-
ization in infrastructure-centric and node-centric systems,
respectively. In Sections V and VI, we show how mobile
base stations can be applied to secure localization in sensor
and mobile ad-hoc networks. In Section VII, we analyze our
schemes. In Section VIII, we overview the related work. We
conclude the paper in Section IX.
II. Model
In this section, we describe our system and attacker
models.
A. System model
Our system consists of a set of covert base stations
(CBS) and a set of public base stations (PBS) forming a
localization infrastructure. Here, by covert base stations we
mean those base stations whose locations are known only to
the authority controlling the veriﬁcation infrastructure. To2
prevent their locations from being discovered through radio
signal analysis covert base stations are silent on the wireless
channel; they only listen to the on-going communication.
In our system covert and public base stations know their
locations or can obtain their locations securely and passively
(e.g., through secure GPS [25]). Here, we assume that the
attackers cannot tamper with these locations nor compro-
mise the base stations.
We also assume that every legitimate node shares a secret
key with the base stations, or that base stations hold
an authentic public key of the node. This key is estab-
lished/obtained through the authority controlling the veri-
ﬁcation infrastructure prior to position veriﬁcation. Here,
all communication between the authority and a node is
performed through a public base station,whereas the hidden
stations remain passive.
We further assume that covert base stations can measure
received signal strength or have an ultrasonic interface
through which they perform ranging.
In most of this work, we assume that covert base stations
are static. Thus, their mutual communication and their
communication to the veriﬁcation authority is performed
through a channel that preserves their location privacy;
this communication channel is typically wired (or infrared),
such that they cannot be detected by the attackers. In
Section V, we modify our assumptions. We replace the
public and covert base stations with mobile base stations,
and we assume that their mutual communication is wireless.
Finally we assume that the nodes (legitimate or other-
wise) have a limited number of attempts to prove their
location to the infrastructure. This is needed in order to
prevent that the nodes simply try diﬀerent distances until
they get it right.
B. Attacker model
We observe two types of attacks: internal and external.
Internal attacks are those in which a dishonest or compro-
mised node (internal attacker) reports a false position or
convinces the localization infrastructure that it is at a false
position. External attacks are those in which an external
attacker convinces an honest node and the localization
infrastructure that the node is at a diﬀerent position from
its true position (i.e., the attacker spoofs a node’s position).
We observe two types of localization systems: node-
centric and infrastructure-centric. By a node-centric local-
ization system, we mean that a node computes its position
by observing signals received from public base stations
with known locations. If the localization system is node-
centric, internal attacks are generally straightforward; a
the attacker simply lies about the position that it com-
puted. Infrastructure-centric localization systems are those
in which the infrastructure computes locations of nodes
based on their mutual communication. In multilateration-
based approaches, an internal attacker can cheat on its po-
sition by cheating on ranging mechanisms (i.e., by reporting
false signal strengths and times of signal sending/reception).
In time diﬀerence of arrival (TDOA) systems, an attacker
can cheat by sending signals to base stations at diﬀerent
times (e.g., using directional antennas).
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Fig. 1. An example of localization with Time Diﬀerence Of Arrival.
The base stations CBSA, CBSB and CBSC measure the diﬀerences
of signal arrival times, and computes the position of the attacker.
Attacks by external attackers are similar to those per-
formed by internal attackers. An external attacker can
perform timing attacks by delaying the signal (through
jamming) or speeding it up (through wormhole attacks [22],
[45]). The attacker can also perform power level modiﬁcation
attacks by replaying signals at diﬀerent power levels.
III. Infrastructure-centric localization with
hidden base stations
In this section, we describe a simple solution for securing
infrastructure-centric localization systems, based on time
diﬀerence of arrival (TDOA) and covert base stations.
TDOA is the process of localizing a source of signal in two
(respectively three) dimensions by ﬁnding the intersection
of multiple hyperbola based on the time diﬀerence of arrival
between the signal reception at multiple base stations.Using
two hyperbolas (three base stations) we can obtain two
dimensional device locations, and using three hyperboloids
(four base stations) we can determine three dimensional
locations. The operation of the TDOA technique is shown
on Figure 1. Node A sends a radio signal, and the veriﬁers
measure the diﬀerence between the times t1,t2,t3,t4 of the
signal reception at each veriﬁer and determine the position
of A.
One of the main advantages of TDOA is that node
localization does not require communication from the base
stations to the mobile nodes: the base stations locate mobile
nodes measuring signal reception times at each base station.
This is why TDOA is well suited for secure localization with
hidden base stations.
In our protocol, the base stations are hidden, and only
listen to the beacons sent by the nodes. Upon receiving
the beacons, the base stations compute the nodes location
with TDOA, and check if this location is consistent with the
time diﬀerences. By consistent we mean that the computed
position is not too far from the hyperbola constructed with
measured time diﬀerences (Figure 1). TDOA with hidden
base stationsis designed to detect both internal and external
attacks, and relies on the assumption that the attackers can
guess the locations of base stations only with a very low
probability. The protocol is executed as shown on Figure 2.
Security analysis
Here, p is a position of node A computed from the mea-
sured time diﬀerences and it is the solution to the following3
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Fig. 2. TDOA with hidden base stations
least-square problem:
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where h(p∗,i,j) is the expected diﬀerence of signal reception
times at CBSi and CBSj (based on the known signal
propagation time), if the signal is sent from position p∗ and
|ti
r −t
j
r| is the measured diﬀerence at CBSi and CBSj. ∆ is
the maximal expected inconsistency between the computed
position and the measured time diﬀerences. This inconsis-
tency is caused by the errors in measurements of reception
times and by pair-wise clock drifts of the base stations.
T is the time within which a node needs to reply to a
challenge issued by a public base station; this response time
is important for the prevention of some replay attacks and
to ensure message freshness. N is a fresh nonce. Note that
the covert base stations know which nonce is sent by the
public station. Conventional TDOA schemes are vulnerable
to both internal and external attacks. An internal attacker
can send messages to base stations, with appropriate delays
(potentially using directional antennas) and thus cheat on
its location; external attackers can jam and delay node’s
original messages and thus spoof its location.
With covert base stations, these attacks are prevented; to
successfully cheat, the attackers need to know where the
base stations are located. Otherwise, the attacker needs
to guess the locations of the base stations, and perform
appropriate timing attacks. The attacker’s cheating success
depends on the system precision ∆. Essentially, ∆ deﬁnes
the size of the attacker’s guessing space. Simply, if ∆ is
large, a false position will be more likely accepted, as the
tolerance to inconsistencies will be higher. In Section VII,
we investigate in more detail the relationship between ∆ and
the attacker’s success.
In addition, we need to consider one more external attack
on TDOA - an external wormhole. This attack is performed
as follows: (1) Attacker jams the original localization mes-
sage (m) sent by node A; (2) Attacker replays m from a
location p′
A. As a result, the base stations will be convinced
that the node A is located at p′
A, whereas its true position
is pA. In order to mount this attack, an attacker needs to
be able to jam all hidden base stations and have faster
processing than regular mobile nodes. Finally, in order to
show that the node A is at p′
A, the attacker needs to have
access to this location. Still, this attack is feasible for a
resourceful attacker.
Using covert base stations, this attack is partially pre-
vented by the challenge-response scheme. In our protocol,
the node is expected to reply to a challenge nonce N within
a period T, which limits the time during which the attacker
can mount the attack. Here, T is estimated based on the
expected signal propagation times and node processing
time. We note that this simple challenge-response scheme
could be replaced by a more eﬃcient distance-bounding
protocol [6], [46], in which case, this, and similar attacks
can be completely prevented. In some implementations, this
will require some specialized hardware at the side of nodes
and base stations. The same attacks can also be prevented
through precise time synchronization. However, if the base-
stations and the devices can perform (expensive) distance-
bounding protocols, other (distance-bounding based) ap-
proaches, like Veriﬁable Multilateration [48] can be used for
the veriﬁcation of devices’ location claims. The proposed
TDOA-based location veriﬁcation scheme (without distance
bounding) is therefore a low-cost alternative for location
veriﬁcation in scenarios in which false location claims do not
beneﬁt the attacker, and/or in those scenarios in which the
attacker does not have the ability to perform the described
wormhole attack (i.e., either cannot jam the communication
between the node and the base station or does not have fast-
processing hardware).
In our protocol, node location privacy is not preserved.
However, this protocol can be enhanced to include public
base station authentication which prevents an attacker from
challenging the node and from requesting from it to send
localization signals disclosing its location. Other attacks are
possible on node’s location privacy [38], [19], [39], [42], [23],
[24], but coping with these attacks is out of the scope of this
paper.
IV. Node-centric localization with hidden base
stations
In this section, we present a protocol for secure localiza-
tion in node-centric localization systems. Here, we assume
that the node computed its position through a non-secure
localization system. This position is then reported to the
infrastructure comprised of covert base stations, which then
veriﬁes if the position is correct. In this context, internal
attacks are related to nodes lying about their locations,
whereas external attacksare more complex, and assume that
the attacker spoofs node’s position and then cheats on the
position veriﬁcation mechanisms.
To cope with these attacks, we propose a position ver-
iﬁcation protocol that relies on hidden base stations. In
this protocol, node A reports a position pF to a covert
base station. The CBS then measures its distance dm
F to
the node (passively) and veriﬁes if the reported position
pF corresponds to the measured distance. Our protocol is
executed as follows (assuming that the distance between the
CBS and the node is measured using ultrasonic ranging).
Our protocol is shown on Figure 3. Here N is a nonce
generated by the public base station, ∆ is a combined
localizationand ranging error and T is the time within which
a node needs to reply to a challenge issued by a public base
station.
In this protocol, the infrastructure uses a public base
station to communicate with the node, and a single covert4
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Fig. 3. Position veriﬁcation with hidden base stations
P
dm
F
c
A CBS
d
P
d
PCBS
F
A
A
F
Fig. 4. False position report by node A to the covert base station.
pA is the true node position, pF is the fake node position (reported
by A to CBS), pCBS is the position of CBS. dc
F = d(pF,pCBS) is
the (false) distance between CBS and A, computed by CBS, dm
F is
the (false) distance between A to CBS measured passively by CBS.
If |dc
F − dm
F | ≤ ∆, then pA = pF.
base station to verify the reported position. PBS sends a
challenge to the node A, which then replies by sending
radio and ultrasonic messages, containing the alleged node
position pF. CBS then measures the time diﬀerence between
the time at which it received the radio signal (trf) and
the time at which it received the ultrasound signal (tus),
and computes the distance dc
F = d(pF,pCBS) to A. If
the reported (possibly fake) position corresponds to the
measured (possibly fake) distance, CBS concludes that pF
is the position of A. An illustration of a fake position report
is shown in Figure 4. To do this, CBS simply computes the
distance dc
F = d(pF,pCBS) between its own position pCBS
(which is unknown to the node) and the reported position
pF and compares it with the measured distance dm
F (which
A can enlarge or reduce). If two distances diﬀer by more
than the expected combined localization and ranging error
∆, then the position is rejected; else, the position is accepted
as true node position. An additional veriﬁcation is made by
measuring the node response time T, in order to prevent
replay attacks.
We note that this protocol could be similarly designed
with RF RSS-based ranging techniques or with any other
passive ranging technique available, including passive RF
ranging.
CBS
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Fig. 5. Position spooﬁng attack. (a) The attacker spoofs node A
into believing that it is at the attackers location PF (e.g., using a
fake GPS station), then the attacker jams the localization message
(b) and replays it from its own position there by fooling the CBS into
accepting the position as real (i.e., the distance will match).
Security analysis
An internal attack in node-centric localization schemes
is simply a false position report from the node to the
infrastructure. Our protocol detects false position reports
through checking the consistency of the reported position
and of the measured distance. This detection mechanism
relies on the fact that the attacker can guess the distance of
pF to the hidden base station only with a low probability.
We analyze this in detail in Section VII.
External attacks against position veriﬁcation are more
complex and include position spooﬁng, jamming and mes-
sage replays. Figure 5 shows an external attack on position
veriﬁcation. Node A is positioned at pA, the attacker at
position pF. The attacker ﬁrst spoofs the position of A such
that A believes that it is positioned at pF. Then, by replay-
ing A’s localization signals (radio and ultrasound) from pF,
the attacker fools the position veriﬁcation mechanism. This
attack enables the attacker to convince the device A that it
(A) is positioned at pF and then convinces the covert base
station that A is at pF. One limitation of this attack is that
an attacker needs to have a device at the position where it
wants to falsely place A and that the attacker nodes need
to be tightly synchronized to perform it.
Our position veriﬁcation protocol partially prevents this
attack by the same technique used in the TDOA protocol
with hidden base stations; the base stations require that
the node replies with the RF message to the PBS challenge
within a time bound T. This limits the time within which
the attacker can mount the attack. With distance-bounding
techniques [6], this attack can be entirely prevented, as the
value of T can be reduced to nanoseconds.
Similarlyto our TDOA-based protocol,the position veriﬁ-
cation protocol is also vulnerable to location privacy threats.
Here, the most obvious privacy problem is that the node
discloses its position to any station that issues a position
veriﬁcation request (step 2 in the protocol). An attacker can
simply listen to the node’s messages and learn where the
node is located. Similarly, an attacker could send a position
veriﬁcation request to the node to keep track of the node’s
position. This attack can be prevented by simply requiring
a public base station to authenticate itself to the node, and
by having a node encrypt the position information that it
sends to the base stations.
A cloning attack is an attack in witch the attackersuccess-
fully compromises a node to such a degree, that private keys
and other secret node-speciﬁc information can be copied.5
The attacker can now deploy any number of copies of the
original node throughout the network. Our protocols make
no attempt to detect cloning attacks, however, ﬁngerprint-
ing [36] could be used as a way of distinguishing the copies
from the original. It should be noted that a cloning attack
does not constitute a breach of security in, e.g., an access
control application, since the attacker still needs to place a
clone within the access controlled area.
Finally the attacker can interfere with the communication
of legitimate nodes to change the time of ﬂight of a signal,
thereby making it seem as if the nodes a reporting false
positions. Some applications might want to exclude nodes
after a certain number of false positions have been received
and in such a case this attack could be very damaging,
however, this is entirely application and policy speciﬁc.
Excluding a node after a number of false positions have been
received is straitforward as the protocol requires the node
to send signed messages. While an attacker might succeed
in performing a denial of service attack and thus introduce
more false positives, the attacker can only create a false
negative with a very small probability (see section VII).
V. Secure localization in sensor networks with
mobile base stations
The use of mobile base stations has already been proposed
for data collection, energy preservation, localization and
security in wireless networks [41], [49], [21]. Many mobile
platforms have emerged as a result: Amigobot [1], Cotsbot
[5], Millibot [31], Robomote [12], and Ragobot [17].
In this section, we describe the use of mobile base stations
for secure localization in sensor networks.
A. Scenario
In our scenario we rely on mobile base stations. We show
how mobile base stations can be used to secure localization
and to verify the locations of sensor nodes.
We assume that the sensors compute their locations
through one of the non-secure localization algorithms [13],
[7], [47], [33], [32], [44], [30], [14], [11].
We further assume that the authority has a number of
mobile base stations (similar to data mules), that know se-
curely their locations (e.g., through secure GPS [25]). These
mobile base stations can be single-purpose or multi-purpose,
and therefore can be used for only position veriﬁcation or
also for data collection and other tasks.
We assume that the mobile base stations share a secret
key with each sensor.
B. Position veriﬁcation with mobile base stations
The protocol presented in this section is similar to the
position veriﬁcation protocol presented in Section IV. That
protocol relied on the assumption that the covert base sta-
tion is hidden, whereas all communication between the node
and the localization infrastructure is performed through the
public base station.
Here, position veriﬁcation is performed through mobile
base stations. This is realized such that the base station
sends a veriﬁcation request to the node from one location,
and then waits for the response at a diﬀerent location.
MBS A
MBS,N,TR //
mrf = {p,MACK(rf,p,MBS,A,N)}
mus = {p,MACK(us,p,MBS,A,N)}
move to a new location
send mrf and mus simultaneously
for the next TR seconds
mrf oo
mus oo o/ o/ o/ o/ o/ o/
receive mrf at trf and mus at tus
d
c
A = d(p,pMBS)
d
m
A = (tus − trf)   vs
if |d
c
A − d
m
A| ≤ ∆ then pA = p ; else reject p
Fig. 6. Position veriﬁcation with mobile base stations.
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Fig. 7. Position veriﬁcation in sensor networks. A mobile base sta-
tion (MBS) veriﬁes locations of nodes; (a) at time t1 MBS challenges
sensor nodes; (b) at time t2 > t1 the sensors reply to the challenge
and their locations are veriﬁed by MBS.
Therefore, at the time of position veriﬁcation, the node does
not know the position of the mobile base station. In this
protocol, the role of a public base station is thus replaced
with base station mobility.
Our protocol is shown in Figure 6. Here, K is the secret
key shared between the mobile station MBS and the sensor
A. After receiving a localization message from the MBS,
A is supposed to send a response for the next TR seconds.
In order to avoid interference from other nodes who also
received the same localization message, a suitable MAC
protocol must be used to ensure that everyone has access
to the channel. TR is also the time within which MBS must
move to a new location and receive the response from all
the nodes that are still in range.
TR must not give away any information about the dis-
tance from the current transmission position to the next
veriﬁcation position. Further more, TR must allow enough
time for the MBS to wait a few seconds at its new location
until all the nodes have replied.
The operationof our protocol is illustratedon Figure 7. At
time t1 a mobile base station (MBS) is at position pMBS(t1)
and sends a message to the neighboring sensors containing
a challenge nonce N and a time delay TR after which the
sensors needs to reply to the message. Within the time TR,
MBS moves to a diﬀerent position pMBS(t2) within the
circle deﬁned by its power range when it was at position
pMBS(t1). When at position pMBS(t2), MBS receives a reply
from those sensors which are still in its power range. Based
on received replies, MBS computes the distances to the
sensors and veriﬁes their locations (this procedure is the
same as in the position veriﬁcation protocol presented in
Section IV.6
t1 t2
t3
Fig. 8. Progress of position veriﬁcation in sensor networks with mo-
bile base stations. MBS moves from position pMBS(t1) to pMBS(t2)
and pMBS(t3).
C. Mobile base station coverage and simulation
Typically, the MBS can perform simultaneous veriﬁcation
of locations of multiple sensors. If, at each motion step t2,
the MBS moves within the circle deﬁned by its power range,
it will hear at least 39% of the sensors that were in its power
range at time t1, provided that the sensors are uniformly
distributed over the MBSs power range1. This is because
the intersection of the MBSs power ranges at t1 and at t2
will be at least 39% of the circle surface, given that the MBS
moved within its previous power range. At time t1 the MBS
broadcasted a challenge to the nodes, and at time t2, the
nodes replied. After position veriﬁcation, the MBS issues
another challenge for the nodes in its power range whose
locations were not veriﬁed; then, the MBS moves again and
waits for their reply. Hence, as the MBS moves through the
network, it will only verify locations of those sensors which
were in the intersections of two subsequent power ranges
of the MBS. This is illustrated on Figure 8. The trajectory
of the MBS needs to be unpredictable for the sensor nodes,
even if the sensors collude. One way to ensure this, is to have
the MBSs move according to a random walk. Given this, if
the sensors are placed on a grid, the time in which the MBS
covers the network can be estimated as O(N logN), where
N is the number of sensors. In [41], [3], the authors provide
a set of analytical and simulation results for coverage times
of mobile stations on sensor grids.
If the sensors are randomly distributed, the coverage time
will depend on the radio range and on the movement range
of the MBS (and speed of course). In Figure 9 is a plot of
the coverage as a function of the movement range. A single
mobile base station moves according to a random walk for
60 seconds in a 500 × 500 meter area with 300 nodes. The
four diﬀerent curves are four diﬀerent transmission ranges.
It is clear from the ﬁgure that the best results are achieved
if the movement range and the transmission range are equal
(or very similar). This is because if the movement range is
smaller than the transmission range the MBS does not take
full advantage of the size by not moving far enough, and if
1This also assumes that either the MBS and the nodes have the
same transmission radius or the MBS have a high gain antenna that
will enable it to receive the reply from within its own transmission
radius.
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Fig. 9. Mobile base station coverage for diﬀerent values of trans-
mission and movement range (step size). Every point on the graph
is the average result of 50 simulations, the vertical bars indicate the
95% conﬁdence interval.
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Fig. 10. Mobile base station coverage as a function of time. Every
point on the graph is the average result of 50 simulations, the vertical
bars indicate the 95% conﬁdence interval.
the movement range is larger than the transmission range
the MBS will move too far away to receive the replays from
all the nodes. Of course the coverage improves when the
transmission/movement range is increased.
Figure 10 shows the coverage time of 300 sensors placed
randomly throughout an area of 500×500 meters. One node
is chosen to be a mobile base station and moves through
the network using random walk. At each position the MBS
listens for the reply to previous challenges, issues a new
challenge, picks a new point on the disc described by its
transmission range and moves there. The speed at which
the MBS moves is set to 50m/s, about the speed of a small
drone over a battleﬁeld, and the node timeout TR is set to
5 seconds.
As expected the performance increases with the transmis-
sion/movement range as more nodes are localized in each
step. A function on the form
C = at + bln(t) + c (1)
can be ﬁtted to each of the three data plots, where C is
the relative coverage and t is the time. The parameters
a, b and c are determined by the size of the area, the
speed of the MBS and the transmission/movement range.7
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Fig. 11. Node A gathers signed witness statements about its location
in order to update a central location database (residing on the server
S). Each using the protocol in Figure 12, nodes B, C and D ﬁrst
verify the location of A (steps 1,2,3) and then send (to A) signed
statements about its location. A then sends its position along with
collected witness statements (positive and negative) in a conﬁdential
message to the server (step 4).
Using (1) it is possible to estimate the required equipment
speciﬁcations (i.e., speed and transmission range) needed to
cover a particular area in a particular amount of time.
Security and location privacy analysis of this protocol is
very similar to the one of the position veriﬁcation protocol
presented in Section IV, and thus we do not repeat it here.
VI. Location Verification In Mobile Ad-hoc
Networks
In this section, we show how our node-centric position
veriﬁcation protocols (Section IV) can be used for location
veriﬁcation and secure location updates in mobile ad-hoc
networks. The scenario presented in this section diﬀers from
the scenario in Section V in that there are no dedicated
mobile base stations that move around and localize nodes.
Instead, in this scenario, nodes obtain their positions using
a global positioning system (e.g., GPS [18]), and rely on
their neighbors for position veriﬁcation. We further assume
that all nodes in the network have passive ranging capa-
bilities; we describe our protocols assuming that the nodes
implement US-based passive ranging,although other passive
ranging scheme can be used (e.g., RSSI-based ranging).
A. Location database update
We consider a scenario in which, a node A wants to update
its location in a central location database. This update can
be motivated by a need to prove that the node was at a
speciﬁc location at a speciﬁc time (e.g., to support secure
location-based routing). In order to update its location, the
node will rely on the (signed) statements of its neighbors.
In order to ensure the authenticity of these statements,
we assume that all nodes have a public/private key pair
and that each node shares a secret key with the location
database server. This scenario is illustrated in Figure 11.
In order to update its location at the server, node A exe-
cutes the protocol shown in Figure 12. A starts the protocol
by announcing on both RF and US channels its location in
a broadcast signed message containing its location PA, and
the timestamp TA. A’s neighbors (e.g. B) verify A’s location
claim and then issue timestamped and signed statements
statB regarding A’s claim. These statements can be either
A : pick N ← {0,1}
k
A // /o /o /o // ∗ : A,PA,TA,N,signKA{A,PA,TA,N}
B : d
c
A ← dist(PA,PB)
d
m
A ← (tus − trf)   vs
if |d
c
A − d
m
A| ≤ ∆
then m ← encKBS(B,A,TB,PA,ok)
else m ← encKBS(B,A,TB,PA,nok)
statB ← m,signKB{m,N}
B // A : statB
A // S : m
Fig. 12. Node B issues a witness location statement, attesting if
A was at location PA at time TB. Note that A does not know if
B’s witness statement is positive (ok) or negative (nok). A forwards
this statement to the server S (in a private message) (possibly over
multiple hops). A’s location PA is therefore disclosed only to its
surrounding nodes (for location veriﬁcation) and to the location
server S, and is not disclosed to other network nodes.
positive (containing the string ’ok’) or negative (containing
the string ’nok’), stating that the reported location PA is
correct or incorrect, respectively; here KBS is the secret
key shared between B and the server S. Note that A does
not know if B’s witness statement is positive or negative.
Upon verifying that the statement originated from B, A
forwards this conﬁdential message to the server S (possibly
over multiple hops); alternatively, B can directly report
its statement to the server. A’s location PA is therefore
disclosed only to the location server S and to its surround-
ing nodes (for location veriﬁcation purposes). The loca-
tion server collects statements about node locations, and
infers if nodes’ claimed locations, and location statements
of their neighbors match. The information collected at the
server can then be used by the network nodes e.g., for
secure location-based routing, and by the server e.g., for
the detection of malicious or selﬁsh node behavior. We note
that before each location veriﬁcation a node (B) needs to
estimate if its position is suﬃciently unpredictable for the
prover (A). This, B can do locally by monitoring how much
it moved since its last transmission.
B. Security analysis
An attacker that wants to falsify its location must make
the distance calculated at the receiver, match the position
the attacker reports. We analyze this in detail in Sec-
tion VII. However, one point is of special signiﬁcance in the
case of mobile ad-hoc networks; since node mutually verify
each-others’ locations, they will equally, by transmissions
or by explicit disclosure (for veriﬁcation purposes), disclose
their locations. If an attacker, therefore, listens to the com-
munication between the claimant node and its witnesses,
it will at least observe the location of the claimant and
at most the locations of its veriﬁers. If the attacker then
initiates the veriﬁcation of its own location right after, it
can successfully cheat on its location, since it knows the
locations of all its neighbors. To prevent such attacks, nodes
monitor how much they moved since their last transmission,
or how much time elapsed since their last transmission.
Only if they moved signiﬁcantly and/or enough time has
passed since their last transmission, will the nodes engage
in a location veriﬁcation protocol as witnesses. As we discuss8
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Fig. 13. Probability distribution function of the distance dc
F =
d(pF,pCBS) on a disk (PD) and in a ball (PB), when pCBS and
pF are chosen uniformly over the disk and ball, respectively.
above, the proposed protocol preserves nodes’ privacy from
all nodes except from their neighbors (that need to know
the node’s location in order to verify it).
VII. Analysis
In this section, we analyze the likelihoodthat an (internal)
attacker succeeds in cheating our secure position veriﬁcation
schemes by guessing the locations of or the distances to the
covert base stations. This probability will notably depend
on the size of attacker’s search space (which depends on
base station power ranges) and on the precision of the
localization system.
First, we focus on the position veriﬁcation protocol de-
scribed in Section IV. We deﬁne the attacker’s success as the
event where the attacker A reports a position pF diﬀerent
from its true position (pF  = pA), and the CBS concludes
that pA = pF. This event will be realized only if |dc
F −dm
F | ≤
∆. This essentiallymeans that an attacker needs to guess the
distance to the covert base station dA, in order to engineer
the signals such that the CBS measures a dm
F equal to the
distance to the reported (fake) position dc
F. The probability
of attackers success is therefore
P(|d
c
F − d
m
F | ≤ ∆
˛
˛ pF  = pA) (2)
In our analysis we assume that the localization takes place
on a disk (2D), and in a ball (3D). The position of the hidden
base station and the reported position of the attacker are
therefore on a disk (or in the ball). We assume that the
position of the base station is uniformly chosen on the disk
(in the ball). Other geometries can be observed, but we have
chosen the circles as they best reﬂect the power ranges of
the devices.
A. Attacker’s average success probability
To compute the average probability of attacker’s success,
we assume that the attacker and the hidden base station are
placed uniformly on a disk/ball. In this case, the probability
distribution function (pdf) of the distance between the
attacker and the hidden base station is given by [40]:
PD(dA = d) =
4d
πR2 cos
−1(
d
2R
) −
2d2
πR3
r
1 −
d2
4R2 (3)
for a disk and by
PB(dA = d) =
3d2
R3 −
9d3
4R4 +
3d5
16R6 (4)
for a ball, where R is the radius of the disk/ball. PD
and PB are shown on Figure 13. The maximum values of
these functions are PD(dA = 0.84R) = 0.809 and PB(dA =
1.05R) = 0.942. This means that when the attacker is trying
to guess the distance to the CBS d(pA,pCBS), he will have
the highest chance of success if his guess is dA = 0.84R (for a
disk). In this case, the probability of attacker’s success will
be:
PD,uni =
Z 0.84R+∆
0.84R−∆
PD dd ≈ 0.809   2
∆
R
(5)
PB,uni =
Z 1.05R+∆
1.05R−∆
PB dd ≈ 0.942   2
∆
R
(6)
These approximations hold for ∆ ≪ R. These results are
importantas they show that the the probabilityof attacker’s
success grows linearly with the localization and ranging
error ∆ and inversely proportional to radius of the region in
which the hidden base station is placed. This means that the
probability of the attackers success is inversely proportional
to the square root of the space in which localizationis taking
place. Simply, the more precise the localization and distance
measurement is, and the larger the space is, the more secure
position veriﬁcation is.
The probability of the attacker’s success can be signif-
icantly reduced if multiple covert base stations are used
for position veriﬁcation. In that case, the probability of
attacker’s success is simply
P
n
D,uni ≈
„
0.809   2
∆
R
« n
(7)
P
n
B,uni ≈
„
0.942   2
∆
R
« n
(8)
The probability of attacker’s success in both disk and ball
can therefore be upper-bounded by Pn
uni = (2∆
R)n.
B. Attacker’s maximum success probability
So far, we have assumed that the attackers position pA is
chosen uniformly, meaning that we have assumed that the
position at which the attacker is placed, can be anywhere
within the disk/ball. Here, we observe for which position
pA the attacker will have the highest probability of success.
We show that the attacker has the highest probability of
success (Pmax) if it chooses its position pA at the center
of the disk/ball and if it chooses dm
F = R − ∆ as its fake
measured distance to CBS. This probability is as follows9
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Fig. 14. The probability of successfully guessing the direction of one
of the CBS while at the same time not hitting any of the other base
stations (Phit · Pmtr). Note that the angle is relative to the size of
the guessing space.
(for a disk):
PD(dA ≤ d) =
πd2
πR2
PD(dA = d ± ∆) =
π(d + ∆)2 − π(d − ∆)2
πR2
=
4d∆
R2
PmaxD =PD(dA = (R − ∆) ± ∆)
=
4∆(R − ∆)
R2 (9)
Similarly for the ball, we obtain that PB(dA = (R − ∆) ±
∆) =
6∆(R−∆)
2+2∆
3
R3 . From this it followsthat the maximum
probability of the attacker’s success given n CBS is
Pmax
n
D =
„
4∆(R − ∆)
R2
« n
(10)
Pmax
n
B =
„
6∆(R − ∆)2 + 2∆3
R3
« n
(11)
This analysis shows that in the worst-case scenario, the
maximum probability of attacker’s success is approx 2.5
times (disk, 2D) and 3 times (ball, 3D) the average proba-
bility of attacker’s success (when n = 1).
Intuitive proof: It is suﬃcient to observe that the set with
the highest number of points equidistant from a single point
p in a disc/ball is the set of points on a circle (sphere) of
radius R, when p is at the center of a disk/ball.
C. Extending the analysis to TDOA
In the case of position veriﬁcation using TDOA as de-
scribed in section III there is one additional element that
the attacker must consider. If the attacker is to fake his
position in a TDOA environment he must also guess the
direction in which he needs to point his directional antenna
in order to send the delayed message to the correct base
station. We will look at the scenario in which the attacker
has the highest probability of success which is it case when
the attacker positionshimself in the center of the veriﬁcation
circle.
If the covert base stations are randomly distributed across
the veriﬁcation space, the probability of the attacker hitting
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Fig. 15. An example of an attacker guessing the directions to 4
covert base stations in such a way that a transmission to any of the
covert base stations would not be received by anyone else.
the correct CBS depends on the angle of his transmission
cone. If the angle θ is 0◦ the probabilityof hitting the correct
base station is also 0. If the angle is θmax (i.e., 360◦ in a full
circle) then the probability of hitting the correct CBS is 1.
We can write the following relation between probability and
angle:
Phit =
θ
θmax
= θrel (12)
where θ is the absolute angle and θrel is the relative angle of
the transmission cone (relative to the angle of the available
space).
Choosing a large transmission angle in order to increase
the probability of hitting the correct CBS has one unde-
sired consequence, it also increases the probability that the
attacker hits one of the other covert base stations. In order
to succeed in his attack, the attacker must hit the correct
base station and not hit any of the remaining base stations.
The probability of not hitting other base stations is given
by:
Pmtr = (1 − θrel)
n−1 (13)
where n is the number of base stations (i.e., minimum three
in 2D).
The best choice for the attacker is to pick the angle that
maximizes his chance to hit the desired CBS but at the
same time minimizes the risk of hitting anyone else i.e., the
maximum of Phit   Pmtr. It is straightforward to show that
the maximum of Phit   Pmtr is 1
n.
In Figure 14 Phit   Pmtr is plotted as a function of the
relative angle of the transmission cone for n = {2,3,4,6,12}
base stations. If there are four CBS we can see from Fig-
ure 14 that the attacker would pick a transmission cone
width of one fourth of the guessing space, or θ = 90◦, giving
a probability of successfully guessing the direction of one of
the CBS while at the same time not hitting anyone else of
10.5%. But that is only the direction to one of the CBSs.
Now the attacker must ﬁnd the next CBS, however, his
guessing space is reduced from 360◦ to 360◦−90◦ = 270◦ and
the number of base stations is reduced from 4 to 3. Because
there are now only three base stations the attacker will chose
an angle of one third of the remaining guessing space, or 90◦,
this gives a probability of successfully guessing the direction
of another of the CBS while at the same time not hitting
any of the other stations of 14.8%. Now the guessing space is
further reduced to 270◦−90◦ = 180◦ and the number of base
stations is 2. Choosing θ = 90◦ (half the guessing space) the
probability is 25%. After this there is only one CBS left and10
CBS positioning
region
detection region
(where CBSs can be
placed)
R'
R
pA
Fig. 16. localization and detection region. If the base stations can
be positioned outside of the localization zone, that the probability of
the attacker’s success can be further decreased.
we know that it is in the last quarter of the original guessing
space. The combined probability of correctly aiming four
directional antennas at four covert base stations without
accidently hitting any wrong CBS is therefore
0.105   0.148   0.25 = 0.0039
Following the above procedure it is easy to see that the
combined probability of correctly aiming N directional an-
tennas at N covert base stations without accidently hitting
any wrong CBS can be written as
N Y
n=1
1
n
„
1 −
1
n
« n−1
(14)
Where N is the number of covert base stations in the
veriﬁcation space.
It should be clariﬁed that this probability only covers the
aiming of the antennas. If an attacker actually want to cheat
on a location in a TDOA environment he must also fake the
distance to each of the covert base stations. In the case of
four CBSs (N = 4) and an acceptable error of ∆ = 0.01R the
maximum probability of successfully falsifying a position is
Psuccess =
4 Y
n=1
1
n
„
1 −
1
n
« n−1
 
„
4∆(R − ∆)
R2
« 4
=3.9 × 10
−3   2.5 × 10
−6
=9.6 × 10
−9
D. Further reducing the probability of attacker’s success
The attacker’s success can be further reduced by in-
creasing the space in which the covert base stations can
be positioned. So far we have assumed that the region in
which the device proves its position (localization region)
is the same as the region within which the covert base
stations are positioned. However, the covert base stations
can also be placed outside of the localization region (around
the localization region). The maximal distance from the
covert base stations to the localization region will depend
on the power range of the attacker’s device and on the
receiver sensitivity of the base stations. This is illustrated
on Figure 16. In this case, the maximum probability of at-
tacker’s success is further reduced from PmaxD =
4∆(R−∆)
R2
and PmaxB =
6∆(R−∆)
2+2∆
3
R3 to Pmax′
D =
4∆(R
′−∆)
R′2 and
Pmax′
B =
6∆(R
′−∆)
2+2∆
3
R′3 , respectively, as R′ > R.
This example further shows that regardless of the size of
the localization region (which can be arbitrarily small), the
probabilityof attacker’s success can be small if the detection
region is suﬃciently large.
It should be noted for completeness that a sophisticated
attacker might try to obtain information about the location
of a mobile or covert base station, using a radar based
system capable of detecting antenna backscatter (i.e., the
energy that is re-radiated by a receiving antenna). However,
this energy is very week compared to the original signal, and
the radar signature it generates is no bigger than the signa-
tures from other small metal objects in the environment [8].
For this reason, it would be diﬃcult, if not impossible,
for the attacker to detect the presence and/or location of
covert/mobile nodes in most (e.g., urban) environments.
E. Sensitivity
In this section, we analyze the frequency of false positives
and false negatives as a function of the expected localization
and ranging error ∆. If the authority sets ∆ to 0, the
probability of the attacker’s success will be 0, but due to
the localization and ranging errors the system will reject
all reported locations, even if the device is not faking its
position. In this case, the frequency of false positives will
therefore be 1. Similarly, if ∆ is set to 1
2R (R being the
radius of the veriﬁcation space), then the probability of the
attacker’s success will be 1 (the attacker will assume that
the CBS is 1
2R away and 1
2R ± ∆ will then cover the entire
space). In that case the false locations of the attacker will be
accepted every time and the frequency of false negatives will
be 1. It is therefore importantto set ∆ such that it minimizes
the false negatives and false positives. This means that ∆
should be chosen as a minimum value that properly reﬂects
localization and ranging errors.
As we have already noted, CBSs accept the position of
the node if |dc
F −dm
F | ≤ ∆. There are two sources of error in
this system. The ﬁrst error is the localization error errorP,
which is contained in the reported position pF. The second
error is the ranging error errorR and it is contained in the
distance measurement of dm
F . The total error in |dc
F − dm
F |
is therefore error = errorP + errorR. If localization and
ranging errors are already known and if we can assume that
they are Gaussian errorP ∼ N(0,σ2
P) and errorR ∼ N(0,σ2
R)
the the total error of |dc
F −dm
F | is error ∼ N(0,σ2 = σ2
P +σ2
R).
If the errors are non-Gaussian or even not independent, then
we do assume that the joint distribution of the error can be
obtained experimentally.
Without any loss of generality, we can express ∆ in terms
of σ as follows:
∆ =kσ (15)
where k is a positive real number and σ is the standard de-
viation of error (σ =
√
σP + σR) for independent Gaussian
errors). In the case that error is Gaussian, the probability
that dc
F − dm
F falls within the interval [−kσ,kσ] is given11
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Fig. 17. The frequency of false positives and false negatives, and a crossover error rate for σ = 0.005R, n = 5 (a), σ = 0.005R,n = 10 (b),
σ = 0.01R,n = 5 (c), σ = 0.01R,n = 10 (d). s = 1/k is the sensitivity. ∆ = kσ is the tolerated localization and ranging error. σ is the
standard deviation of the localization and ranging error. Note that the probability axis is logarithmic.
by [34]:
P(−kσ < d
c
F − d
m
F < kσ) =
2
√
π
Z k √
2
0
e
−u
2
du
=erf
„
k
√
2
«
(16)
Here, interval [−kσ,kσ] is called the conﬁdence interval. The
frequency of false positives can then be computed as:
PFP = 1 − P(−kσ < d
c
F − d
m
F < kσ) (17)
i.e., as the probability that dc
F −dm
F does not fall within the
interval [−kσ,kσ].
The frequency of false negatives is simply the probability
of the attacker’s success given by (in 2D):
PFN =
4∆(R − ∆)
R2 =
4kσ(R − kσ)
R2 (18)
For n covert base stations, these probabilities are deﬁned
as follows. The frequency of false positives is deﬁned as
the probability that at least one of the covert base stations
rejects the reported position, even if the position is correct.
This probability is given by
P
n
FP = 1 − P(−kσ < d
c
F − d
m
F < kσ)
n (19)
Similarly the frequency of false negatives for n covert base
stations is deﬁned as the probability that all the base
stations accept the reported position even if this position
is false. This probability is given simply as a probability of
attacker’s success for n covert base stations:
P
n
FN =
„
4kσ(R − kσ)
R2
« n
(20)
Figure 17 shows the the frequency of false positives and
false negatives as a function sensitivity s. Here, s is deﬁned
as 1/k. Sensitivity s is thus inversely proportional to the
expected error ∆ and is a measure of how sensitive the
position veriﬁcation is to errors; if s = ∞, this means
that the system is very sensitive, and that localization
and ranging errors will are not tolerated, if s = 0, this
means that the system tolerates any error. Consequently,
the frequencies of false positives and false negatives depend
on s.
Figure 17 shows the frequencies of false positives and
false negatives for 5 and 10 covert base stations, and for
σ = 0.005R (0.5% of R) and σ = 0.01R (1% of R). The
emphasis in these ﬁgures is on the crossover error rate.
The crossover error rate is the error rate at which the false
positive frequency equals the frequency of false negatives.
From these ﬁgures we observe, as expected, that with the
increase in the number of covert base stations, and with the
reduction of the standard deviation of the localization and
ranging error σ, the crossover error rate can signiﬁcantly
reduced. If the number of covert base stations is n = 5 and
if σ = 0.01R, the crossover error rate will be about 1×10−4.12
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Fig. 18. The frequency of false negatives (probability of attacker
success) if the frequency of false positives is set to 1%.
This error rate is signiﬁcantly reduced to approximately
1 × 10−9 if the σ is reduced to 0.005R and if the number
of covert base stations is increased to n = 10.
Even if the crossover error rate is a good indicator of
system performance, we emphasize that the security of the
system can be signiﬁcantly improved if the system can allow
for a higher false positive frequency. We show in Figure 18
the probability of false negatives (probability of attacker’s
success) as a function of the number of covert base stations,
given that the frequency of false positives is set to 1%. This
ﬁgure shows that with the frequency of false positives set to
1%, the probabilityof attacker’ssuccess is signiﬁcantlylower
than the crossover error rate. We therefore observe that with
5 or more covert base stations, the probability of attacker’s
success is lower than 10−5 with standard deviation of error
smaller than 0.03R.
We can also observe that with localization systems that
exhibit high standard deviation of error (up to 30% or the
region radius R), the probability of attacker’s success can
still be signiﬁcantly reduced by increasing the number of
covert base stations. For example, with σ = 0.2R and 20
hidden stations, the probability of attacker’s success is only
2 × 10−6.
F. Integration with existing localization systems
A number of systems for localization and ranging of
wireless devices have already been proposed, based on the
propagation of RF, ultrasound and infrared signals. Most
of these systems can be adapted to work with covert base
stations. Here, we present a short overview of the precision
and area sizes of existing localization and ranging systems
and we discuss how they can be integrated with secure
localization based on covert base stations.
If localization is based on GPS, the accuracy of the
localization will be in 95% of cases better than 1m. RF time
of ﬂight techniques being developed for localization GSM
and CDMA Position aim to provide accuracy of 50-100m
and 10m, in the case of UL-TOA, GSM and AGPS, CDMA,
respectively. Note here that these systems are designed for
area and cell sizes which can have radiuses of 500m (in
highly dense urban areas) to 35km (in the countryside).
Indoor, localization with WiFi based on signal strength
measurements with locationﬁngerprintingcan achieve local-
ization accuracy of 2-3m, whereas ultrasound-based ranging
and localization systems can be accurate down to a few
centimeters. Ultra wide band (UWB) time-of-ﬂight based
systems work both indoor and outdoor [2]. Indoor they can
achieve ranging precision better than 1m for ranges of up to
50m and localization accuracy of up to 15cm. Outdoor the
accuracy of UWB localization and ranging systems can be
also very high, approx. 1m for distances of up to 2km [16].
All the numbers presented in this paragraph are rough
approximations of accuracies of these systems; each of these
systems can perform better or worse, if one or more of
system parameters change.
Here, we use the term accuracy very loosely as the mea-
sures of accuracy vary from one system to another. For
example, if GPS localization is used for providing position
reference to a device, and UWB ranging is used for position
veriﬁcation, the standard deviation of the error can be
estimated at up to 4 meters. Given that the range of UWB
localization can be up to 2km than σ < 0.005R. Indoor, if
ultrasound is used for localization and ultrasonic ranging
for veriﬁcation, we can assume the standard deviation of
error to be of the order of 20 centimeters and ranges up
to 20m, meaning that σ = 0.01R. As we have shown in
Figures 17 and 18, the probability of attacker’s success in
these scenarios will then be as low as 10−35.
VIII. Related work
In the last decade, a number of indoor localization sys-
tems were proposed, based notably on infrared [50], ultra-
sound [51], [35], received radio signal strength [4], [20], [10]
and time-of-ﬂight radio signal propagation techniques [27],
[15]. These localization techniques were then extended and
used for localization in sensor and ad hoc networks [13], [7],
[47], [33], [32], [44], [30], [14].
Recently, a number of secure distance and location veriﬁ-
cation have been proposed. Brands and Chaum [6] proposed
a distance bounding protocol that can be used to verify
the proximity of two devices connected by a wired link.
Sastry, Shankar and Wagner [43] proposed a new distance
bounding protocol, based on ultrasound and radio wireless
communication. In that work, the authors also propose to
make use of multiple base stations to narrow down the area
in which the nodes lie. However, as the proposal is based
on ultrasound distance bounding, it can be used only for
the veriﬁcation of nodes’ locations, and only if external
nodes have no access to the area of interest. In [22], the
authors propose a mechanism called “packet leashes” that
aims at preventing wormhole attacks by making use of the
geographic location of the nodes (geographic leashes), or of
the transmission time of the packet between the nodes (tem-
poral leashes). Kuhn [25] proposed an asymmetric security
mechanism for navigation signals. That proposal aims at
securing systems like GPS [18]. Capkun and Hubaux [48]
propose a technique called veriﬁable multilateration, based
on distance-bounding, which enables a local infrastructure
to verify locations of the nodes. They further show how
that technique can be extended for secure localization of
a network of sensors. Lazos et al. [26] proposed a set of
techniques for secure localization of a network of sensors
based on directional antennas and distance bounding. Li13
et al. [28] propose statistical methods for securing local-
ization in wireless sensor networks. Liu et al. [29] propose
techniques for the detection of malicious attacks against
beacon-based location discovery in sensor networks, based
on consistency of received beacons. Rasmussen, Capkun and
Cagalj propose SecNav [37] that relies on signal broadcasts
using I-codes [9] to achieve secure localization and time
synchronization. Recently, a number of proposals have been
made to protect the anonymity and location privacy of
wireless devices [38], [19], [39], [42], [23], [24].
IX. Conclusion
In this work, we proposed a novel approach to secure
localization based on covert (hidden and mobile) base sta-
tions. This approach enables secure localization with a
broad spectrum of localization techniques: ultrasonic or
RF, based on received signal strength or on time of signal
ﬂight. We have demonstrated that that this approach can
be easily integrated with several existing node-centric and
infrastructure-centric localization schemes. We have shown
how security of this approach depends on the precision of
the localization systems and on the number of covert base
stations. Our future work includes implementations of our
schemes and their evaluation in various indoor and outdoor
scenarios. We also intend to investigate in more detail the
privacy implications of our approach.
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